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Meltzer

on

Pension
Senator John
committee

legislation,

re

pension plans. Professor Meltzer, after
were received, was invited to
at the hearings on the pending bills. After his
testify
testimony on July 1, 1957, Professor Meltzer prepared
a
supplemental memorandum for the sub-committee.
Because of the widespread interest in the legislation
involved, Professor Meltzer's memorandum is (except
for the introductory paragraph) reproduced below,
following a summary of his oral testimony.
In his testimony, Professor Meltzer emphasized the
need for avoiding legislation which would produce
an
unmanageable l1WSS of reports, but at the same
time he questioned the basis for the various exemp
tions from comprehensive disclosure regulation em
and

his written comments

bodied in the various bills. He pointed also to the
practical and legal obstacles to the enforcement of
fiduciary obligations by private litigation, and he
urged that federal legislation should go beyond dis
closure requirements and should prohibit transactions
incompatible with fiduciary standards. He suggested
that the penal provisions of the pending bills which
do this

sought to
how they

were

vague and indicated

unduly

could be made

He

recom

mended also that

should be

supple

mented

civil suits in the

more

specific.

penal provisions
by provisions authorizing

courts on the part of both the enjorcement
agency and the aggrieved beneficiaries. Finally, he
presented the reasons for making the Securities and

federal

Exchange Commission,

rather than the

Secretary of

Labor, the enforcement agency.
In his

supplemental

memorandum

Professor

Meltzer

stated:
on

1

July

emphasized

both the sub

stantial administrative difficulties involved in
disclosure

regulations

the effectiveness

and the

of such

reasons

regulation

for

standards.

explicitly challenge
disclosure
a

total

on

the

regulatory

I did not,

desirability

the motion of

non

of

general
doubting

unless it

supplemented by provisions incorporating
menting fiduciary

of

and

was

imple

however,

comprehensive

-exempt plans,

as

part

program.

I feel it appropriate to supplement my testimony
because further consideration has persuaded me that
such automatic disclosure is probably not necessary

for effective
concentrated

fiduciary

( 1) Prohibitions against specified violations of fiduciary
standards, implemented by both criminal sanctions and civil
actions in the federal courts;

(2) Provisions requiring adequate and accurate disclosure to
beneficiaries, implemented by criminal sanctions and injunctive
relief at the request of the enforcing agency;
( 3) Provisions authorizing the enforcing agency
(a) by regulation to prescribe record-keeping require
ments

regulation
on

and that

legislation

which

the definition and enforcement of

standards would be

a

preferable

alternative.

for health and welfare

plans;

(b) by regulation, subject to veto by either House of
Congress, to prohibit additional classes of transac
tions deemed incompatible with fiduciary standards;
(c) to call for comprehensive reports from, to subpoena
and/or to inspect the books and records of, or per
taining to, particular welfare and pension plans se
lected

by

the agency.

foregoing proposals would, I believe, have the
following advantages over the general and automatic
The

disclosure

pending

provisions

which

are

a

central feature of

bills:

( 1) They would avoid the logical and political difficulties
raised by exemptions which are deemed necessary to keep the
enforcement

job manageable,

but which

are

highly

contro

versial.
more directly and effectively attack the
problem of misconduct by fiduciaries.
( 3) They would involve less cost to the government and to
properly managed plans, which presumably represent the over
whelming majority of all plans of any type.

(2) They would

central

Before I examine the merits of

regulation
above,

it

general

and the alternative pro g r
is appropriate that I make

a m

disclosure

outlined

explicit

my

assumptions concerning the primary purposes of the
contemplated legislation. I assume these purposes to
be: (1) the deterrence of misconduct, i.e., malfea
sance, by fiduciaries; (2) provision for adequate and
accurate disclosure to beneficiaries; and (3) the en
forcement of appropriate criminal and civil sanctions
against delinquent fiduciaries. I assume, moreover,

pending bills are not designed to insure wise,
distinguished from honest, administration. They
are, for example, not directed at achieving actuarial
soundness in pension plans or wise investment policies.
I consider this limitation of the legislative purpose
desirable, and I will not extend this memorandum by
examining the many problems involved.
I exclude also from the legislative purposes the
collection of comprehensive data concerning the
general impact of welfare and pension plans on em
ployee-employer relationships or on our economic life
generally. This is not to deny that such data might
be interesting and useful and might have implications
for public policy. Nevertheless, the data necessary
for such purposes can be collected by means which
much less costly than. dis clos ure regulation.
are
Furthermore, the collection of such data generally
that the
as

My testimony

alternative program would contain the
elements, which are developed more fully

below:

quested Professor Bernard D. Meltzer, of the Law
School, to comment on various bills for the regulation
of welfare

an

following

the Senate Sub

of

and Pension

9
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Such

Welfare and
Legislation

Chairman

Kennedy,
Welfare

on

of Chicago
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proves more useful if it is prompted by specific prob
lems rather than by the vague hope that the informa
tion will come in handy. Finally, any
attempt to use

disclosure

regulation

for the collection of

comprehen
objective of using

sive

data would clash with the

such

regulation for the purpose of promoting proper
by fiduciaries. This is true because the polic

conduct
of

fiduciaries, if the administrative burden is to
kept manageable, requires the narrowing of cover
age so as to exempt plans in which danger of abuse

ing
be
is

whereas the accumulation of

negligible,

data demands

complete

coverage. For these
reasons, in the discussion which follows, disclosure
requirements and alternatives thereto will be tested
solely by their probable contribution to the observance
of fiduciary standards; any collateraL benefits
arising
from the availability of comprehensive data
regarding
welfare and pension plans will be
disregarded.

comprehensive

which relies largely on general dis
closure requirements involves two fundamental diffi
culties. The first, which has been a
principal concern
of the Committee, is the need for exemptions with
three characteristics: ( 1) They must be

Legislation

numerically

significant
tive costs

be

to

avoid either

enormous administra
of reports, most of which cannot
examined. (2) They should be based on

so as

or a mass

carefully

principles

with

rational

relationship to the legisla
plans should be an
probability of fiduciary
abuse is low both in relation to
non-exempt plans
and as an absolute matter. (3)
Finally, the exemp
tions must, of course, command the
necessary political
support. The second difficulty of disclosure regulation,
which has apparently been of less concern to the
a

tive purposes, i.e., the
exempted
identifiable class in which the

Committee,

the

is

regulation,

even

made and

an

adequate enforcement staff provided,
significantly advance the legislative purposes.

would
I turn

uncertainty as to whether such
though appropriate exemptions are

now to a

As my

discussion of each of these difficulties.

testimony indicated,

contemplated by
ministration

bill)

whether it is

each of the

the various bills
involves

a

exemptions

(except

serious

the Ad

question

as

to

related to the legislative pur
need to repeat my testimony, but

largest single class of plans and are usually
solely by the employer. For this reason,

administered

my comments
tion

for

concerning

the level-of-benefit exemp
applicable to the exemption

large
employer-administered plans contemplated by

are

to

a

extent

S. 1813.

Fiduciary
gations

misconduct disclosed

has been concentrated in

by

recent investi

jointly-administered

a

hand. John

Leary, Library of the

Cromwell

the American Bar Foundation, R. E. Dokmo, Presi
Burdette-Smith. Company, and Don Hyndman, Director

dent of
of Public Relations for the American Bar Association.

plans which, at present, generally provide, not for a
specified level of benefits, but for a specified level of
expenditure. Despite this fact, a statutory exemption
for level-of-benefit plans seems unwarranted, for the
following reasons: First, such investigation involved
level-of-benefit plans administered by large, respected
and publicly exposed companies, such as General
Motors. The result of such investigation plainly can
not properly be viewed as a certificate of
good char
acter for all such plans.
such
Secondly,
plans are
the
to
such
as
abuses,
susceptible
split commissions,
and

kickbacks, which have occurred in other kinds of
plans. And a flat statutory exemption for level-of
benefit plans might well generate pressure by strong
and unscrupulous union officials to transform existing
or

future

plans

so

as

to

bring

the

into

exemption

play. If such pressure proved successful, a statutory
exemption would on practice operate to exempt plans
and administrators

templated

when the

quite different
exemption was

from those

con

embodied in the

statute.

rationally

poses. There is no
I do wish to supplement my discussion of the
pro
posed exemption for level-of-benefit plans. Such plans,
according to the Committee's data, constitute by far
the

The ABA lends

Library of

It is true, of course, that
centive to

keep

an

employer

has

an

in

the cost of the level-of-benefit

plans
"employer" is an abstraction which
particular employees may not be
averse to
feathering their personal nests. Further
more, the "employer's" incentive operates only as to
his actual costs, as opposed to his ostensible costs. He
has no incentive, for example, to forego kickbacks and
the like so long as they go back to the enterprise. On
low. But the term
obscures the fact

the contrary, he may have an incentive to arrange for
such transactions in order to inflate the ostensible
costs

of

of the benefits. This is true because the

specified

benefits

are

in effect

costs

wages, and the total
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when they provide the level-of-benefits contracted
for. This attitude is inconsistent both with employers'
insistence in other contexts that

fringe

costs

in

are

from wage costs and with the incon
trovertible proposition that employees are entitled to
know the level of their wages. In view of the fore

distinguishable

going considerations, level-of-benefit plans,

exempted

from the

duty to disclose
be exempted from

even

if

the govern

to

a
ment, should not
requirement
of adequate disclosure to the beneficiaries of the plans.
On the basic issue raised by the level of benefit

exemption, the probability

of malfeasance in admin

istration, it is, I believe, fair

templated exemptions,
support

the basis of

on

to

say that of all

it has the

strongest

investigations

con

claim to

thus far.

But

the

investigation obviously did not consider the pos
sibility that strong and unscrupulous elements in the
labor movement might exert effective pressure to

In Burton

Lounge after the groundbreaking, Charles Rhyne,
President of the American Bar Association, R. E. Dokmo, Presi
dent of Burdette-Smith Company, Barnabas Sears, President

of

the benefits of this

secure

the Illinois State Bar Association, Erwin Roemer, of the Law
School Visiting Committee, Walter T. Fisher, '17, and Maurice

Shanberg, JD'26.

of-benefit
of such actual

ostensible

factor in

such

bargaining negotiations. High costs, actual
ostensible, will provide arguments against re

that

or

will be

costs

a

increases in the level of benefits or the level
of conventional wages. Since the ostensible costs are
wages, the employees are entitled to an

quested

adequate quid

pro quo in the form of benefits which are not diluted
by excessive commissions, kickbacks, and the like. In
connection with the
incentive,
employer's cost
it should also be noted that

cutting
companies making

cents

per-hour contributions also have an incentive, albeit
a more indirect
one, to get the most for their money
in the form of
employee benefits. Benefits attract and
hold efficient
eration in

a

employees
period like

vigorous competition
more,

the

a

-

not

unimportant

consid

the present when there is
for such employees. Further

employer's cost-cutting

incentive,

even

its

effectiveness, does not achieve one of the
of
objectives the proposed legislation, namely fair and
assuming

adequate
Under

amended,

disclosure

the

to

the

Nat ion

an

employer

requested by
furnish data

collective

a

as

union
to

a

I

employees.
Labor Relations

is, of

Act,

as

obliged, when
representing his employees, to
course,

actual costs where that is relevant

bargaining negotiations. But this obliga
tion is plainly not the same as an
obligation to make
periodic reports to the employees concerning the costs
and the benefits under a plan. This difference is
underscored by the increasing tendency toward longer
term collective bargaining
agreements. Furthermore,
have
employers
apparently resisted demands for dis
closure on the ground that their duty is discharged
to

for

improper

plans.

plans

For these reasons, the

from disclosure

exemption

of

regulation
grounds
questionable.
The foregoing objections to the "level-of-benefit"
exemption have been urged by organized labor, whose
opposition may, of course, defeat any legislation. Such
opposition is, doubtlessly, reinforced by the fear that

collective
or

exemption

purposes. And, as already indicated, the investigations
were limited, and the abuses
they disclosed in other
could
and
have
occur,
occurred, in level
plans
may
rests

on

are

such

exemption

an

plication

would involve the distasteful im

that abuses result

sole administrators of
.

their administration.

only when unions are the
plans or jointly participate in

As my

testimony indicated, the
practical political problems resulting from such oppo
sition

matter on which the Committee needs no
from outsiders. Nevertheless, it is
significant
that one consequence of such
opposition may be legis
lative proposals for disclosure regulation so
compre
hensive in their coverage that they would involve the
dilemma of either an
unmanageahle mass of
are a

comment

reports

mammoth and very
Such a dilemma would, for

cr

a

costly enforcement staff.
example, appear to be the

necessary result of the enactment of the Administra
tion bill, which does not provide for
at
any

exemption

all.

Such

part

on

possibilities reinforce more fundamental
considerations indicating that the disclosure
regula
tion contemplated
may, in the context of pension and
welfare plans, be the wrong way to attack the
problem
of fiduciary abuse.
Disclosure requirements alone obviously do not
prohibit improper transactions. All they do is to make
them known. Their effect as a deterrent depends in
the

sense

wise engage in

of shame of those who would other

improprieties

and in part

on

Continued

the effecon

page 31
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which fill in

Reports

a

of Chicago

fe\v

of the gaps. But because the amendment, for prac
tical considerations, had to be pushed through Con

fact,

unfortunately

about it which

questions
In

there

rapidly,

gress

experts have suggested

some

there is doubt whether the
to

reverse

the

Supreme

motion.

Moreover,

there is

a

very

at

sea

things

is

adequate

it does this

much,

that the

Treasury will
Congress by adopting

In the meantime

forthcoming
we are

pro
very much

since the Service refuses to issue any

the vital

on

assuming

rumor

construction in its

posed regulations.

say the least.
that technically

legislation

the intention of

narrow

number of

a

to

Court decision which set it in

even

disquieting

again thwart
a

are

vexing,

are

rulings

Under these circumstances,
at the moment are almost as unsettled as
they

questions.

before passage of the amendment. Perhaps by
this time next year we will have some definite word
in the form of Regulations and will be able to make
were

our

plans

with confidence.

the

Treasury will see
Amendment reasonably
Congress to amend the

We

the
so

can

and

light

that

only hope

we

as a

sample,

I

am sure

the

won't have to ask

Amendment."

In view of the fact that I chose this
sion of the author's

interpret

that

you will understand my omis
I hope that he, too, will

name.

be

understanding.
Finally there is one

other item

concerning

the 1967

Institute program which candor
compels me to reveal.
On the opening day there is a dinner session. The

of it, which is set in
exceptionally bold
reads
as follows:
"This session is reserved ex
type,
clusively for entertainment; absolutely no speeches
announcement

of any kind will be

MeltzerContinued

permitted."

from

page 11

tiveness of sanctions

against improper

conduct

once

it

is disclosed.

I will not

speculate

the

on

sense

of shame of those

involved in the serious abuses uncovered

beyond saying

mittee,

by

the Com

that those disclosures do not

any optimism. The inescapable danger under
pending legislation is that disclosure regulation,
unaccompanied by effective sanctions agajnst im
proprieties disclosed, would have no significant effect
warrant

the

the conduct of thick-skinned and faithless fidu

on

Disclosure

ciaries.

regulation

which

at

best

produces

confessions, without repentance, scarcely justifies the

heavy
on

regulation would impose
plans and on the govern

burdens which such

honestly

administered

ment.

The sanctions

of the

plans

investigation

now

applicable

to

maladministration

involved have, as the Subcommittee's
has indicated, been inadequate in prac

tice and may remain

portant
excerpt only
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to note that

In this

so.

connection, it
the

notwithstanding
contemplated

resemblance between the

legislation

is im

superficial

disclosure

and the Securities Act of 1933, there is

a

basic difference between them. In the securities field,
there is a drastic and well-known sanction supple

menting

the criminal

provisions for false disclosure.

stop order by the SEC will, in general, make the
No comparable sanction
securities unmarketable.

A

for disclosure in the context of welfare and

exists

pension plans. Furthermore, it seems clear that in
exercising its authority to issue stop orders, the SEC
considers not

only the adequacy of disclosure but also
any overreaching or unfairness in a securities offering.
The SEC is thus in effect exercising a regulatory
authority, which would not be available to the enforc
ing agency under the pending legislation.
It is possible, of course, that the contemplated dis
closure requirements, coupled with effective federal
state cooperation,
might lead to more effective en
forcement on the state level by state agencies as well
as
by the beneficiaries of the plans. But the variety
of state regulatory systems and the substantial ob
stacles to effective enforcement by beneficiaries which
would

persist leaves this

matter in

considerable doubt.

The

foregoing discussion suggests that (1) dis
closure regulation, without direct and effective sanc
tions

Emil Sandstrom

of Sweden, President of the International
of Legal Science, and Andre Bertrand of France,
Secretarq-Cetieral of the Association, with Professor Soia

Association

"At entschikofJ.

against malfeasance by

trustees

(as distinguished

from sanctions for false

reports)

jectural benefits of
burdens involved.

legislation justify

may be ineffective
in advancing the statutory purposes; and (2) there is,
accordingly, a serious question as to whether the con
such

Alternative

which do not involve

general

means

disclosure

of

the

heavy

regulation,

requirements
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companies, investment advisors, actuarial experts
like, which are not involved in the purchase
insurance or other services for a plan but only

trust

and the
of

carry out investment functions or other functions
which do not involve any possibility of conflicting in

enterprises selling insurance or other serv
plan. Furthermore, in order not to prohibit,
in appropriate cases,
ownership of insurance com
panies or of medical clinics, etc., by welfare and
terests in

ices to

a

pension funds, there should be a provision for admin
istrative exemption from this restriction. Such an ex
emption might, for example, be granted to the Amal
gamated Clothing Workers of America with respect
to insurance
companies owned by funds administered
by that union. (See p. 44 of Final Rept. of Sen. Com
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Rept. No. 1734,
84th Congo 2d Sess. )

( c) Lending money
of which he is

a

or
borrowing
fiduciary.

to,

money from,

a

plan

or assets of any kind,
directly or in
directly, to the plan unless the market value thereof
is independently established by transactions on an
organized securities exchange or the like and the price
to the plan is not in excess of the price so established.
( e) Purchasing property from the plan unless the market
value thereof is independently established (as above)
and unless the purchase price is at least as high as

( d) Selling property

the

price

so

(f) Receiving
Mr. Charles

Rhyne, of Washington,

It has become

entertain the President

customary for the

of the

ABA

of the
Mentschikotf,

D. C., President

American Bar Association, with Professor Soia
during the luncheon held in Mr. Bhsme:« honor

Faculty.

plan

Law

shortly after

assumes

who

office.

of

are

I

believe, achieve the statutory objectives

more

and with

indirect

beneficiaries of the

compensation

( 2) Criminal

could,

or

compensation

for services rendered to it if the

from the

fiduciary,

dur

ing the calendar year in which such services are
rendered, was employed by an employer or union
establishing, or contributing to the plan, or partici
pating in its administration, or representing employees

by the Law
Faculty to
he

established.

direct

sanctions

in

excess

against

of

plan,

at

an

annual

rate

$3,500.

any person who

"fiduciary," who knowingly participates in
of the foregoing provisions by a fiduciary.

is

not

a

the violation of any

significantly less cost to the gov
ernment and the legitimate
private interests involved.
The alternative regulation would incorporate the
following elements:

effectively

( 1) Criminal provisions against embezzlement of the assets
a
plan and against the following kinds of specified miscon
duct, by any trustee, administrator, or employee of any plan or
by any employee or officer of any enterprise or organization
establishing a plan (all of whom are herein included in the
of

term

"fiduciary");
( a) Receipt of any compensation, direct

or

indirect, from

any person or company, selling, directly or indirectly,
insurance or any other service to the plan involved or

any other welfare

pension plan.
(b) Owning the securities of, or having a property in
terest in (other than an interest resulting from the
to

issuance of

of

personal

or

insurance

business),

policies

in the

ordinary

officer, em
ployee, or member of the board of directors, of any
company, firm, person, agency, broker, selling insur
course

other services

or

serving

the

as

an

plan involved or to any
other welfare or pension plan. This provision should,
however, be so limited as to be inapplicable to banks,
ance or

to

portion of the French delegation at the Conference of the
of Legal Science: Counsellor of State
Mere Ancel, Counsellor of State Andre Letourner, and Andre
Bertrand, Secretary-General of the Association.
A

International Association
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be enforceable

( 4)

civil

by

as

criminal actions.

fiduciaries should be under

provision that

A

well

as

administer the assets of the

to
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provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) above would

The

(3)

Chicago

plan solely

in

a

duty (a)

the interests of its

beneficiaries and (b) to avoid any transactions in the name of,
or on behalf of, the
plan, as a result of which, or in connection
with which a fiduciary benefits directly or indirectly, except
in his capacity as a beneficiary. This provision would be im
plemented by civil actions exclusively.

(5)
in

a

duties

general

(above) would

4

par.

provision that third persons knowingly participating

A

breach of the

be

also

imposed
subject to

fiduciaries by
civil actions for

on

damages.
(6) The enforcing agency would have authority by regula
that

provide

tion to

classes of transactions would be

specified

provisions or to the civil fiduciary
standards. Such regulations prior to their promulgation would
be filed with Congress while in session and would become
effective only if neither House registered its dissent within a
specified period.

subject

either criminal

to

( 7) Both the enforcing agency and the beneficiaries would
have

right

a

to

agency, prior

to

its intention to
a

bring the civil actions provided for and to
brought by the other. The enforcing

actions

in

intervene

specified waiting

who established

which

they

venors

filed

a

or

on

made

same

notice of

a

to

substantial contribution

to

a

actions

would,

as

inter

in the court's

reasonable counsel's fee.

A

judg

federal court would be bar to an action
In
a state court and vice versa.
collusive actions, provision should be made for

the merits in

on

the

as

government-instituted

in

give

permit the beneficiaries, within
the action. Beneficiaries
institute
to
period
serious breach by a fiduciary in actions
so

discretion, be entitled
ment

civil actions would

instituting

do so,

a

transaction in

John Anthony Jolowicz, of Oxford University, Visiting
the

University of Chicago
Quarter, 1957.

turer in Law at

the AH-tumn

order to prevent
this bar to operate

scribed notice

as

only if the enforcing agency was given pre
filing of actions by private individuals so
in appropriate cases, could intervene. (If vio
to

that the agency,
lations of the statute should

benefit

entitled

plans,
to

generally

the

seem

occur

in connection with level-of

problems as to who would be
resulting damages. The employer-entity would
entitled to the damages where such violations

there would be

increased his

less,

for the

agreed-upon

Lec

during

benefits. Neverthe

the

controlling interest
owning
employer-entity might be responsible for the abuse which

in

in the

net cost

Law School

some

cases,

may have been
plan. In such

all

those

prompted by

a

or

desire

to

inflate the costs of the

situation, recovery of full damages by the
entity would seem anomalous. It is difficult to deal specifically
a

variety of circumstances which may arise. Accord
the court should in its discretion be authorized to grant
to the
employees,
part of the damages to the employer,
and should be directed to allocate dam
the

with the

ingly,
all
or

or

to

ages

so

government,
to promote the statutory objectives.)

as

( 8) The enforcing agency should be authorized

to

prescribe

by regulations the content, auditing and the form of the ac
counts and records, etc., of the plans as well as the period
which the accounts and records should be kept. Violations of
such

regulations

(9) The
( a)

should be made

statute

For

should also

periodic reports

a

crime.

provide:
to

the beneficiaries

total contribution made

by
employees, respectively, and
accrued under the plan.
(b)

For

authority

in

the

form and content,
to

meeting of the Round Table on Family Stability during the
Conference of the International Association of Legal Science.
Professor Rheinstein was Chairman of the Round Table.

A

that

provided

the

showing
employer and

the benefits available

the
the
or

enforcing agency to prescribe the
including information in addition

for in

(a) (above), of such reports.

( c) That such reports to the employees should advise
them of the name and address of the enforcing
agency and should indicate that information as to im
proper conduct or as to inadequate disclosure in con-
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nection with

be

sent to

the administration of the

foregoing proposal for the elimination of gen
opposed to selective, disclosure requirements
involves judgments on difficult questions of degree.
Accordingly, before I conclude this memorandum, it
seems desirable to refer to considerations
qualifying
the position developed above.

plan should

The

the agency.

eral,

duly verified copy of such reports be filed and
preserved by the custodian of the books and records
of a plan, in accordance with the regulations of the
enforcing agency.

( d) That

a

(e) That wilful falsification in such reports, or wilful
ure to make them, or wilful omissions therefrom
stitute

a

fail

crime.

make

designated persons (clearly described in the
statute or by administrative regulation) shall be under
a
duty to make such reports to the beneficiaries. (This
provision should, I believe, impose this duty on offi
cers of
employers in connection with plans established
and administered solely by employers, on trustees of
jointly-administered plans, and on union officers in
connection with plans established and administered
solely by unions. This provision should not require
organizations

as

banks and trust

companies

a

plans

The

ren

costs

can

here.

be

was

reliably estimated,

Finally,

part of

balanced

a

as

to

the

which is

not

the

case

exemption problem, statutory

usually crude and imperfect qualifica
tions on the legislative purposes, and exemptions
which cannot neatly be supported on logical grounds
often result from the practical need to reduce both
the government's enforcement burden and the cost
exemptions

plan.

foregoing proposals are a tentative framework
vastly improved by the informed

which could be

sideration of these

government

underlying question, which is whether the return
regulation would justify both the re
sultant burdens and the logical and practical prob
lems raised by an attempt to reduce such burdens
by means of the various exemptions contemplated by
the pending regulations. Although I have expressed
my doubts about the adequacy of the return I recog
nize the difficulty of
making firm judgments about
the impact of disclosure requirements. Similarly there
is no formula for
determining the wisdom of the costs
of enforcing a legislative program even when such

the data within their possession necessary for
(Compare S 1122, Sec. 6 (a) and 6 ( d)

criticism of the Committee's staff and others.

legislative purposes,
contribution which would be increased if automatic

the

to

relevant to the administration of any

the

from disclosure

(10) The agency should be authorized, in its discretion, to
require plans to furnish the information described in Section 6
of S 1122, to subpoena their books or to inspect their books at
reasonable times and should be given similar subpoena and
inspection authority with respect to the books of any person
are

to

program which included effectively implemented fidu
ciary standards. But this conclusion does not answer

such reports.
of S 1122.)

which

of course,

requirements would,

contribution

some

disclosure to the

report directly to bene
but should require such organizations to

ficiaries

certify

such

services to

dering

as

General disclosure

con

That

(f)
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Con

are

the Committee is, I

proposals by
as
already indicated, they
to
have
the
appear
following advantages over pending
bills relying largely on general disclosure require
believe, warranted because,

ments.

( 1) The alternative proposals would avoid the analytical

practical problems involved in carving out exemptions from
regulation.
(2) They would avoid the great burdens which general dis

and

disclosure

closure
and
such

plans

requirements would impose on both the government
honestly administered plans unless exemptions from
requirements could be devised for honestly administered

on

in any class of

plans,

which

seems

unlikely.

( 3) They would directly prohibit, and impose appropriate
sanctions on, improper conduct; this promises to be more effec
tive than the indirect requirement of disclosure, which is a
doubtful method of

deterring fiduciary

abuses in this

area.

( 4) They would authorize administrative requirements for
proper record-keeping, thereby facilitating proof of impropriety.
( 5) They would permit the enforcing agency to be selective
in its demands for comprehensive disclosure, thereby conserv
ing its resources for situations which warrant scrutiny.
(6) They would encourage beneficiaries to enforce the fidu
ciary duties owed to them and would, at the same time, avoid
the. dangers arising from the concentration of enforcement in
a

single

agency

or

group.

The Law and Behavioral Science Senior Fellows

left
.

to

right: Jacob

Weissman

of Columbia,

now

for 1958-59,
a

Research

Associate in Law and Economics, Reginald A. H. Robson, of
the University of Nebraska College of Law, Erwin Smigel,

Professor of SOciology at Indiana University, W. Howard Mann,
Professor of Law, University of Indiana, and Joseph Lazar,
Instructor in Sociology at Columbia University. Not shown is
Louis

Kreisberg.
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compliance by especially appealing interests, such
Such necessarily practical and
as «small business."
imperfect accommodation of conflicting 0 b j e c ti v e s
may be inescapable in connection with pension and
welfare legislation.
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The

foregoing considerations,

jections
the

to

the disclosure and

pending bills,

by the large stakes
pension plans and the com
to

protect their

as

exemptions

to

are

general
resolved,

disclosure
it bears

require
repetition

regulatory burdens of
such disclosure requirements would be justified unless
they are coupled with an effectively implemented
code of fiduciary conduct. Such a code appears to be
an
indispensable prerequisite for effective legislation.
seems

Furthermore,
for

unlikely

as

that the

my testimony indicated, the reasons
from disclosure requirements do not

exemptions
operate to justify exemptions from such a code; on
the contrary, disclosure exemption increases the need
for the

applicability

of

fiduciary

standards.

Accord

I renew my recommendation that such stand
ards should be made
applicable to all plans, and

ingly,

those

which

especially
plans
general disclosure requirements.
to

This is

are

exempted

from

Respectfully submitted,
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immortal Point Four
a

classic in its

During the more than thirty years that I have
Philip M. Glick, I have always been impressed
his
earnestness, understanding and integrity, and
by

known

the sort of subdued brilliance and
man.

He

was one

all

versity,

of

personal

Governmental

opportunities

its first aureoled

quiet

drive of the

group of classmates at the Uni
friends, who rose to the manifold
a

days. They

under the New Deal in
were

all, and
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than Mr. Glick, highly articulate, social minded and
dedicated men, who helped give tone and meaning

so

to

the

In

deep

administration.

There

nothing blase
nor
passive in their temperaments. They welcomed
public service because of the larger opportunities it
offered for men of vision. Each one was capable of
filling remunerative posts in private business, but they
new

was

At the

Luncheon Session of the Labor Conjerence, left to
Archibald Cox, of Harvard Law School, Robert
Professor
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